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Review of Edward Herman Bendix, Componential Analysis of General 
Vocabulary: The Semantic Structure of a Set of Verbs in English, 
Hindi 7 and Japanese 
1. The work under review is E. H. Bendix's attempt to apply a 
version of componential analysis to the semantic structure of a 
set of verbs taken from the 'general vocabulary'. The verbs--
from English, Hindi, and Japanese--all express a semantic relation 
associated with the English verb~· What this means can be 
seen in the following paraphrases: (i) to say that I gave a thing 
to John is to say that I did something which resulted in John's 
having the thing; (ii) to say that I took a thing from John is to 
say that there was a time when John had the thing, and then I did 
something which resulted in my having it; (iii) to say that I got 
rid of a thing is to say that there was a time when I had the thing, 
but then I did something which resulted in my not having it; or 
(iv) to say that I lost a thing is to say that there was a time 
when I had it, and then there was a time when I didn't have it, and 
this change of state came about by chance. The monograph at hand 
is an attempt to devise an apparatus capable of identifying para-
phrases of the type just illustrated. The apparatus turns out to 
require such concepts as 'cause', 'chance', 'time', the various 
logical operations, and the means for introducing variables in the 
definiens not found in the definiendum. 
Chapter 1 contains a discussion of the history of componential 
studies, and a few remarks on the author's methodological assump-
tions. Chapter 2 offers a series of 'semantic tests' for deter-
mining the data of semantics. In Chapter 3 the author analyzes 
English~ in its 'general'and 'inherent' senses, providing a 
'transformational definition' (see below) for the general sense 
and relating the inherent sense in various ways to uses of the 
genitive .construction. In Chapter 4 he demonstrates the results 
of applying his semantic tests to the English verbs mentioned above, 
plus~,~ ..!..2£., ~'~,borrow and keep. 
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In Chapters 5 and 6 he examines the synonyms of F.nglish 
E;!!! in Hindi and in Japanese, and he shows how their meanings 
relate them to words in these languages meaning~' receive, 
~' etc. Chapter 7 is a review and summary. Appendices are 
included that deal with the transformational introduction of 
~ in English (via a 'topic transformation') and the various 
semantic tests used for the Hindi and the Japanese material. 
There is much in this monograph that invites detailed 
attention. The chapters on Hindi and Japanese contain useful 
observations on such matters as topicalization and the ways in 
which the difference between inherent and accidental possession 
is expressed in these languages. The discussion of English con-
tains a great many insightful remarks on uses of E;!!! and on the 
genitive construction. My remarks, however, will be limited to 
general questions of semantic theory and to the description of 
certain English verbs. 
2. Semantic Analysis. 
The semantic analysis of sentences is viewed in this work 
as an extension of the kind of logical reformulation of ordinary 
sentences that one learns in the symbolic logic handbooks. It 
is an extension thereof, because while the handbooks assist 
their readers in the correct perception of the logical form of 
a sentence as a whole, semantic analysis in linguistics must 
lead to an understanding of the concepts themselves, and in such 
a way as to make possible the study of such matters as the con-
ceptual interrelatedness of lexical items, the relative complexity 
of concepts, the nature of semantic primitives, and the explica-
tion of certain kinds of semantic judgments on sentences. 
The beginner in logic is frequently asked to formulate, in 
terms of certain arbitrarily chosen symbols and a set of logical 
operators, the logical structure of some (typically categorical) 
sentence like (1). 
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(1) every cloud has a silver lining 
He learns to think through sentence (1) in a way suggested by (2), 
(2) for a thing to be a cloud implies that there is 
some other thing that is silver and is a lining 
and belongs to the former 
and he then expresses (2) symbolically, as, say, (3). 
(3) (x) (Cx:::, ((3 y)((Sy)(Ly)(Bxy)))) 
This is about as far as the beginning logician is expected to go. 
Empirical semantic analysis in linguistics, however, has 
somewhat different requirements. The linguist-semanticist tries 
to discover just those logical operations which are reflected in 
natural language sentences, and just those non-logical concepts 
which constitute, or are definable in terms of, a substantively 
specific set of notions that can be viewed as the conceptual basis 
of a universal semantic theory. 
We may illustrate this extended view by an attempt to capture 
the logical form of sentence (4). 
(4) some people are bastards 
Verbally (in the manner of (2)) we begin with (5), 
(5) 	 there is at least one x such that xis a 
1 person and xis a bastard 
1Already we see a gap between the expressive powers of 
natural language symbols and one particular choice of logical 
notations. The English plural indefinite determiner~ differs 
from the existential quantifier in logic in requiring an under-
standing of plurality. (5), in other words, should be expressed 
in some notation that means "there are at least two ••• ". 
and, symbolically, (6). 
C6) (3 x H ( Px )(Bx) ) 
We must go further, of course, and that is because bastard 
is itself conceptually complex. A more detailed version of (5) 
might be (7). 
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(7) 	 there is some x such that xis human and there 
is some y such that y is the mother of x and 
there is some t such that tis a time and x 
was born at t and y was not married at t 
But (7) still fails, because mother is not a semantic primitive, 
and married, though treated here as a property concept, is 
basically a relational concept. A more correct formulation may 
have to be something like (8). 
(8) 	 there is some x and some t such that xis human 
and tis a time and x was born at t, and there 
is some y such that y is female and y is the 
parent of x, but there is no z such that z is 
married toy at t 
But we still cannot be satisfied. Even if we assume that 'human', 
'parent', 'female', 'born' and 'married' are semantic primitives--
which would mean that they are defined in terms of phenomena of 
the real world, not in terms of other linguistic concepts--the 
way in which references to 'time' are to be understood in the 
definition needs to be made clear, and this requires an extensive-
ly elaborated logic. 
Semantic analysis of natural languages, in short, needs to 
face, at the very least, such problems as (i) what logical opera-
tions are natural to human languages, (ii) what are the substan-
tive semantic primitives in the semantic organization of a given 
language (or of all languages), and (iii) what part do certain 
substantive notions such as 'time' play in semantic theory. 
Bendix addresses himself relevantly to these questions, but 
sometimes in ways which are misguided. 
First, a semantic theory provides a way of converting a 
sentence into its highest-level logical form (in the manner of 
reformulating (4) as (5)), and second, through its lexicon, it 
provides a semantic interpretation for each lexical item in 
the reformulation. It does this, not by dealing with lexical 
items one at a time, but by associating with the 'functions' 
- 34 -
which comprise the 'components' of the reformulation, a set of 
more primitive 'functions' which constitutes paraphrases of 
them. Bendix illustrates the first step with the following 
example (p. 7). Sentence (9) is equated, in some way, with 
expression (10 ). 
(9) 	 John has a dog. 
(10) there is a B such that 1 A has B' and 'A= John' 
Items bounded by single quotes are the highest-level 'components' 
of the meaning of the sentence. Existential quantification 
('there is a B•) is defined for semantic theory in general. The 
separation into 'components• of the type 'A has B' is necessary 
because the dictionary, on Bendix's conception (due to Weinreich), 
has lexical items entered in functional or sentential form. 
Sample lexical items in a Weinreichian dictionary are 'A~ B1 
or 'A is a dog', where variables, represented with early capital 
letters, are place-markers for noun phrases. 
This first step is obviously very important, but unfortunately 
Bendix says nothing whatever about the particular way in which 
(10) is to be determined from (9). Not a hint is given on the 
ways in which the grammatical structure of (9) determines (10), 
nor are any reasons given for the specific form presented in 
(10). The former lack is presumably to be accounted for on an 
assumption that grammatical theory determines the decomposability 
of (9), or possibly on the assumption that (10) (when given 
grammatical structure) is in fact the deep structure (in the 
sense of Chomsky) of sentence (9). I think it exceedingly 
regrettable that nothing is said to clarify this point. 2 
2The difficulty I see in the specific form of (10) has to 
do with the component •A= John'. If (9) isintended to be a 
logically complete sentence, then we are forced to interpret 
'A= John' as meaning that John is (the name of) an individual 
constant, in which case thereformulation of (9) would be more 
accurately given as (i) than as (10): 
(i) 	 there is a B such that 'John has B1 and 'Bis 
a dog' 
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If this is what was intended, then something should have been 
done to make clear that 'A= John' in (10) is not to be consi-
dered one of the components of the meaning of (9). We are to 
assume that 'A= John' has been lifted out solely for the sake 
of representing have in a purely 'functional' form (i.e., as 
'A has B1 ). But-rnthat case, John must be listed in the 
dictionary merely as (the name ~an individual constant, and 
dictionary items, Bendix has told us, are all to be entered in 
'functional' for~. This looks like a contradiction. It may 
be, of course, that the theory of names is a separate matter 
from the issues of semantics and lexicology that Bendix wishes 
to account for in this study; but in that case he should surely 
have begun with an example that used only common nouns. 
If we are t~ understand 1 A = John' in some other way, 
then (9) may need to be reformulated, as, say, (ii). 
(ii) there is an A and there is a B such that 'A= 
John' and 1 B is a dog' and 'A has B' 
But sentence (ii) asserts the existence of John, which (9) 
surely does not. Expression (ii), then, is an incorrect 
reformulation of (9). 
The only alternative is to interpret the symbol'=' as a 
two-termed predicate meaning something like 'is named', and to 
understand (10) as being logically incomplete in containing the 
symbol 'A' as a free variable. The incompleteness of (10) may 
be thought of as matching the incompleteness of (9), in the 
sense of not being intelligible to the hearer independently of 
some other understandings. Sentence (9), in other words, may 
be understood as presupposing, rather than asserting, the 
existence of the A that is named John. Sentence (9) is used, 
if this interpretation is correct-:--only when the hearer already 
knows that John exists and who he is. 
3. Definitions. 
A semantic theory, equipped with an adeq~ate dictionary, 
ultimately provides for each grammatically analyzed sentence a 
paraphrase set, each component of which is terminal, i.e., cannot 
itself be further decomposed into a more detailed paraphrase set. 
The dictionary does this, as we have seen, by providing defini-
tions of terms-in-context. We must now inquire what Bendix 
expects of a definition. 
Unfortunately, Bendix's accounts of the nature of definitions 
are not mutually compatible. Central to his conception of his 
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task is the notion of minimal definition, which he character-
izes (p. 2) as 
a statement of semantic components that are sufficient 
to distinguish the meaning [of a form] paradigmati-
cally from the meanings of all other forms in the 
language. 
Bendix views this choice as forcing out of consideration such 
issues as the combinatory or selectional properties of words, 
connotation, ostensive definition, metaphor, idioms, and the 
processes of semantic change (p. 2). 
I see in the minimal definition principle, as in the metho-
dological goals of redundancy elimination and homophony reduction 
in general, the first place where Bendix has gone wrong. The 
kinds of conclusions that this principle forces on him can be 
seen in his discussion of English give. He argues (pp. ?Of) that 
give means (11) rather than (12). 
(11) cause (somebody) to have 
(12) cause (somebody) to get 
Get entails the notion of 'change', while~ does not; hence 
(12) is more complex 'by one component' (the 'change' component) 
than (11). Give 'means' (11) rather than (12) because there is 
no other English word which means (12) rather than (11); the 
'change' component is redundant. 
I believe Bendix's adherence to this principle to be totally 
wrong, first because if there are phrasal ways of expressing (12), 
a semantic description of English should show that these are 
equivalent to expressions containing give. More important than 
that, however, I believe that the notion of minimal paradigmatic 
contrast has been given an exaggerated importance in linguistic 
analysis in general. A semantic description should be judged by 
the success with which generalizations can be correctly formulated 
in its terms, not at all by the property of having just enough 
'components' associated with each word to distinguish it from 
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every other non-synonymous word in the language. 3 
31 assume that is it this same principle which accounts for 
Bendix's omission of the obligation-to-return sense in the words 
lend and borrow. To say that C lends B to A at time T means, in 
Bendix's terms, that •c has B before T', that •c causes A to 
have B after T', and that •Bis not A's' (pp. 72ff). The fact 
that this particular trio of complements uniquely characterizes 
lend makes it unnecessary (if we accept the 'minimal definition•) 
toindicate that the expression with lend also implies that A is 
under obligation to return B to Cat some time in the future. 
It is conceivable that Bendix has in mind supplementing the 
dictionary component of a semantic theory with a system of 
redundancy rules which will have the effect of filling in the 
needed information, both here and in the case of expressions with 
give. But if this is the case, his attempt to show how semantic 
theory provides descriptions of sentences by identifying para-
phrase sets should surely have included a description and justi-
fication of such a component. This general approach of appealing 
to a •system of oppositions' for definitions reminds me of certain 
discussion in anthropology. Recent proposed changes in the 
'definition' of man have come about, not because of new discoveries 
about the natureof man, but because of new discoveries about 
(among other things) chimpanzees. 
Ordinarily we think of the adequacy of definitions in one 
of two ways: either the set of definitions as a whole provides 
in the simplest way an account of the interrelatedness of the 
concepts for which lexical items exist in a language, or else the 
definitions explain the meanings of 'difficult' or 'less familiar' 
words by using 'easy' or 'more familiar' words. In addition to 
his use of the 'minimal definition' just discussed, Bendix views 
~ of these two considerations as providing further desiderata 
for definitions. 
If we assume that each dictionary entry need not state its 
paraphrase set in terminal (non-decomposable) form, that means 
either that the definiens may contain terms which are elsewhere 
defined in the same dictionary (cross-reference), or that the 
definiens may contain concepts definable within a semantic theory 
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4but independently of the object language. 
4Bendix does not seem to be clear about this distinction, 
and that, I assume, is because the language he started out 
describing was the language he was writing in. We find in his 
definientia, for example, such terms as 'get', 'cause' and 
'change', and we find in the text definitions for (expressions 
containing) these terms. Yet he gives the reader no interpre-
tation of the status of these intermediate concepts, and he no-
where explicitly distinguishes those definitions which are 
language specific from those which belong in the metatheory. 
The employment of intermediate concepts of either type affords 
a way of revealing the interrelatedness of the terms in a lexicon. 
That Bendix wishes this to be one of his goals is found in his 
discussion of taxonomy (p. 6), where he seems to favor the use of 
cross-referencing in definitions as a way of showing class-
membership relationships between concepts. He proposes that 
'lending', 'granting', 'conferring', 'imparting', 
etc., could all be considered kinds of 'giving', with 
their definitions including 'give' as a component. 
Bendix takes this as a desideratum for a definition, but not 
quite as a criterion; we know this because his own definition of 
lend does not contain the term give. 
Alternatively, one could desire for each definition that the 
terms it contains in the definiens be more familiar than the 
terms in the definiendum. Converting 'familiarity' to 'relative 
frequency', Bendix writes (p. 61): 
It is desirable, where possible. to state the compon-
ents of a definition in the object language using 
forms that have a frequency of occurrence which is 
higher than, or at least the same as, that of the forms 
being defined••• Where it is not possible to formulate 
the components in this way, we may have to devise 
symbols and concepts, or borrow them, for example, 
from grammatical description or from the terminology 
of logic, or add lower-frequency items of the object 
language. 
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Once again, what is suggested here is not a criterion, because 
provisions are made for situations in which the conditions can-
not be satisfied. In practice, Bendix seems to reject both of 
these latter conditions, because of his choice of the minimal 
definition criterion; yet the fact that he refers to these as 
desiderata suggests to me that he does not see the conflict. 
That there are conflicts in these various conceptions of 
'definition' can be illustrated by considering alternate defini-
tions of the English kin-term uncle. If we restrict ourselves 
to ter~s that would be known by someone who simply did not know 
the word uncle, an expression like (13) would have to be defined 
in some such way as (14). 
(13) 	 y is x's uncle 
(14) 	 y is either x's mother's brother or x's father's 
brother, or else y is married either to x's 
mother's sister or to x's father's sister5 
5of course, if we were to face the genuine practical problem 
of explaining the meaning of uncle to some child, say, who really 
did not know what it meant, we would surely need to worry about 
whether (14) is in fact in a form the child could understand; and 
it is not. But that, let us agree, is another problem. 
If, on the other hand, we wished our system of definitions to 
interrelate a set of concepts in the simplest way, the most 
highly valued definition of (13) would be (15), or, more accurately, 
(16). 
(15) y is a brother-in-law of one of x's parents 
(16) there is a z such that z is a parent of x and 
y is a brother-in-law of z 
The reason for the adequacy of (16) is that the term brother-
in-law needs to be defined anyway, and the relations between two 
people subsumed in the brother-in-law relation are exactly those 
that can hold between (at least) one of one's parents and one's 
uncle. The definition captures this relationship and simultaneously 
- 40 -
'simplifies' the definition of uncle. Yet it is unlikely that 
there is any speaker of English who correctly understands the 
meaning of brother-in-law, but fails to know the word uncle. 
The point of this digression is that except for highly 
specific purposes, it is impossible to evaluate a system of 
definitions. The concept of minimal definition presupposes an 
understanding of the meaning of every term in the language, 
because only thus can one be sure that a particular semantic 
component or feature is in fact 'redundant'. When definitions 
are conceived of as explanations of less familiar terms through 
the use of more familiar terms, we are equally helpless, first 
because we simply lack knowledge of the ontogeny of meaning-
acquisition, but more importantly because it is surely the case 
that 'familiarity' would rank two words in one order for one 
speaker, in the opposite order for another. An interpretation 
of a system of definitions as expressing the conceptual basis 
of a field of terms, on the other hand, fails to lend itself to 
a sensible distinction between 'cognitively real entities' that 
the linguist as empirical scientist 'discovers', and the conceptual 
entities which the linguist as logical analyst posits. Bendix's 
discussion of definition, in short, offers no new way out of the 
lexicographer's principal dilemma. 
4. Semantic Components. 
But let us assume that some decision can be made about the 
types of relationships that ought to be expressed in a dictionary 
entry, and let us turn our attention to the defining concepts 
themselves. We may begin by seeking an understanding of the 
logical character of proposed semantic primitives. 
A distinction needs to be made between property-terms (one-
argument predicates) and relations (predicates with more than 
one argument). A difficulty in seeing this distinction is that 
relational concepts sometimes show up in natural languages 
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disguised as property terms, i.e., in a 'derelativized' form.  
In illustrating this fact, Bendix cites the familiar ethnological  
definition of uncle as 'male, kinsman, first ascending genera- 
tion, first degree collaterality', and he points out that  
although this definition has the form of a conjunction of property  
terms, all but 'male' are in fact disguised relational terms.  
The existence of words and concepts that are in effect 
derelativized relational terms is what makes necessary the 
positing, in definientia, of quantified variables not found in 
the definiendum. Some words, it is true, are definable simply 
and purely by means of property terms (as when woman is defined 
as 'human, female, adult'), but a great many of the semantically 
interesting words in our language involve relational concepts 
in one way or another. 
5. Negation and Ambiguity. 
Bendix has a great deal to say about negation in semantic 
theory. The first point to make here is that Bendix's use of 
negation sheds light on the use of disjunctions in definitions, 
some of which correspond intuitively to true ambiguity, others 
of which do not. Bendix gives only part of the evidence for this. 
It needs to be explained, first of all, that a semantic 
theory, in Bendix's view, is viewed as nothing more than a device 
for determining, for each grammatically analyzed sentence, the 
set of paraphrases which constitutes its meaning. In this view, 
a semantic theory as such does not account for the ambiguity of 
utterance types, because such judgments are successfully accounted 
for only by noting, on working through the whole grammar, that 
phonetically indistinguishable utterances are sometimes generated 
from underlying representations which have different semantic 
interpretations. 
Bendix criticizes the treatment that Katz and Fodor (1963) 
give to ambiguity on the grounds that they consider the problem, 
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incorrectly, from the 'hearer's point of view' (p. 16). Bendix's 
talk of ambiguity leads him to distinguish utterance types, 
which are capable of being ambiguous, and utterance tokens, which 
are not. An utterance type is ambiguous if some of its tokens 
mean one thing, others mean something else. An utterance token 
corresponds to one set of choices, to one unique intended message, 
on the part of the speaker of the utterance; utterance tokens 
which are phonetically indistinguishable from each other (and are 
therefore capable of being identified with each other by the hearer) 
are tokens of the same utterance type. The Katz and Fodor theory 
had the character it had precisely because it was linked with a 
model of grammar which introduced lexical items as terminal 
symbols of a system of phrase-structure rules. Their theory 
'accounted for' ambiguity as a part of the operation of semantic 
rules only in that restricted sense in which a sentence was ambigu-
ous because one or more of its lexical items was polysemous. 
It seems a little misleading to me to discuss ambiguity in 
terms of the type/token distinction. It is much more relevant to 
speak of the nature of the mapping relationship between semantically 
distinct objects and phonetically distinct objects, as that map-
ping is defined by the grammar as a whole. I assume that Bendix's 
talk of utterance tokens is to be thought of as taking the 
speaker's point of view. It seems more clearly wrong to speak of 
ambiguity from the speaker's than from the hearer's point of view, 
if only for the reasons that a speaker may intend an utterance to 
be ambiguous, or he may not know what it is that he is saying. 
Nevertheless we may stick to Bendix's terms for the next 
point, which is that the operation of logical denial, or negation, 
shows that semantic judgments are basically judgments on utter-
ance tokens, not utterance types. Suppose we wish to say that 
the utterance type,!: means either Q or E,, and, in saying this, 
intend to say that p is ambiguous. That is, it is not the case 
that a given token of ? means that either Q is true or R is true, 
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but rather thAt a given token of Pis either understood as 
asserting g or it is understood as asserting R. Bendix's evidence 
that ttis is the correct way to speak of ambiguity is the way in 
which utterances of the type not-Pare understood. If not-Pis a 
negation of the ambiguous utterance type l, it would have to be 
understood as meaning not-Q and not-R, i.e., its meaning would be 
a joint denial of the two senses by which l: was said to be 
ambiguous. In fact, however, the utterance type not-P either 
means not-Q or it means not-R. 
Consider by way of illustration sentence (17) 
(17) John is a bachelor. 
Let us assume that (17) is ambiguous in the ways made familiar 
by Katz and Fodor. In saying (17) we may be asserting of someone 
called J3hn that he is an unmarried male adult human, or that he 
is a young knight serving under the banner of another knight, or 
that he is the holder of a bachelor's degree. What Bendix's 
conclusions make us realize is that sentence (18) 
(18) John isn't a bachelor 
which is a denial of (17), is actually understood always as a 
denial of one of the alternative meanings we would associate with 
(17), not a denial of all of them at once. That is, if someone 
had just uttered (17) as a way of saying that John is married, he 
would not be expected to admit that he had made a mistake if some-
body pointed out to him that John was a university graduate. The 
speaker would merely, and justly, explain that it was not in that 
sense of bachelor that he was saying of John that John was a 
bachelor. 
What Bendix failed to point out, however, is that there is a 
use of disjunction in definitions that does~ correspond to 
ambiguity proper. Bendix would say that disjunctive definitions 
which operate under negation in the way we have seen require 
either the separation of bachelor into several distinct lexical 
items (distinguished by their definientia), or that in a given 
utterance token one meaning is chosen and semantic judgments are 
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judgments about tokens, not types. By pointing out a new sense 
of disjunction in definitions, however, we shall see reasons for 
preferring the first of these two formulations, because the new 
use can then be thought of as the use of disjunction in a single 
lexical entry. 
I suggest that the word brother-in-law can only be defined 
disjunctively. If I say (19), 
(19) John is Sam's brother-in-law 
I am saying either that John is Sam's wife's brother, or that 
John is Sam's wife's sister's husband, or that John is Sam's 
sister's husband (or that John is Sam(antha)'s husband's brother 
or Sam(antha)•s husband's sister's husband). If I say (20), 
however, 
(20) John isn't Sam's brother-in-law 
and you point out to me that John is Sam's sister's husband, I 
must surely admit that I was wrong. I cannot appropriately reply 
that in saying (20) all I intended to deny was that John was Sam's 
wife's brother. It is clear that in this case a disjunction is 
an appropriate formulation of a single meaning. It is regrettable 
that Bendix's discussion of ambiguity failed to include cases of 
the type of brother-in-law, for then he would have seen the point-
lessness of his hearer's-point-of-view criticism of Katz and 
Fodor. 
6. The Scope of Negation. 
Bendix's view of negation, however, seems to be faulty in 
itself. He distinguishes between 'narrow-scope' and 'wide-scope' 
negation, and he sees an ambiguity in wide-scope negation which 
I am sure is not there--especially if he intends this distinction 
to correspond to properties of negative sentences in natural 
languages. Sentence (21) can be negated in narrow-scope as (22); 
in wide-scope negation, however, expressed as (23), the sentence 
is ambiguously represented as (24), (25), or (26). 
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(21) he has every one 
(22) he not-has every one 
(23) not (he has every one) 
(24) not-he has every one 
( ) he not-has every one 
(26) he has not-every one 
I believe that Bendix does not see what is going on. The very 
least we should expect of (23) is that the expression with not 
should be true just in those cases when the expression without 
not is false. Bendix's failure to see this has a great deal to 
do with the particular sentence he chose to work with. Two 
different people cannot each have every one, so if not-he does, 
then~ does not. Suppose we try a different example: (28), the 
negation of (27). 
(27) John saw the cat 
(28) not (John saw the cat) 
(28) would be interpreted, if I understand Bendix correctly, as 
one of (29)-(31). 
(29) not-John saw the cat 
(30) John not-saw the cat 
(31) John saw not-the-cat 
If this distinction is to be matched by natural language sentences, 
we might assume that Bendix would interpret (29)-(31) as somehow 
representations of the English sentences (32)-(34) 
(32) John didn't see the cat 
(33) John didn't see the cat 
(34) John didn't see the cat 
where italicization expresses the location of contrastive stress. 
It seems to me that it is as clear as anything could be that 
sentences (32)-(34) all deny that John saw the cat, and that the 
position of emphatic stress has merely the function of contrasting 
the sentence with some other presupposed non-negative sentence 
which differs from the presented sentence in the constituent 
whose position is identified by the presence of the contrastive 
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stress. But the semantic expressions (29)-(31) are in fact 
compatible with (27), if it is possible to make any sense what-
ever of the hyphenated phrases. Clearly expression (29) must 
mean that some person distinct from John saw the cat, but this 
state of affairs is perfectly compatible with John's having 
seen the cat too; expression (31) similarly asserts that John 
saw something which was not the cat, but he may have had the 
cat in view too. Similarly, (30) may be interpreted as meaning 
that John 'did something' to the cat distinct from seeing it; but 
he may have seen it too. I have argued elsewhere (Fillmore (1967)) 
that the presumed evidence for a distinction within grammatical 
theory between sentence negation and constituent negation--a 
distinction which only becomes a problem in sentences with certain 
kinds of quantifiers--can always be accounted for in terms of 
other facts about quantifying words. 6 
6rt should be pointed out that a distinction between nega-
tion across quantifiers and quantification across negation only 
appears in logic when there are quantifiers {needless to say), 
that is, with the so-called categorical sentences. To claim for 
natural languages that there is only one type of negation is not 
to proclaim a weakness in natural languages vis a vis logic, for 
any quantified expression with a negation to the left of the 
quantification can be replaced by another and equivalent quanti-
fied expression with a negation to its right (or vice versa) by 
interchanging universal with existential quantification. 
7. Negation and the Number of Components. 
Some of the logical properties of negation might have been 
used to shed some light on the problem of knowing how many 
distinct semantic components it is necessary to posit for a 
single definition. Certainly if the number of components is to 
be involved in determining such matters as the relative complexity 
of concepts, it is important to be able to 'count' them accurately. 
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In his initial treatment of expressions containing the 
word~' Bendix defines (35) as (36) (p. 18f) 
(35) A took B 
(36) (i) 'A got B1 (ii) 1 A caused (A got B) 1 
Suppose that we let_!: represent (35) and.£ and B represent 
(36i) and (36ii) respectively. What could be meant by non-P 
i.e., (37)? 
(37) A didn't take B 
This expression must mean, as Bendix would have it, either (38), 
(39), or (40) 
(38) not-Q and not-R 
(39) not-Q and R 
(40) Q and not-R 
Ordinarily, we would like to say that because of what (36i) and 
(36ii) ~' it is illogical to assert (36ii) (i.e., _g) and deny 
(36i) (i.e.,_£); but our author has explained that semantics 
describes merely what an expression means, and that logic or 
common sense is involved in deciding whether an expression makes 
sense. 
Now, then, how are we to understand the compound expression 
not-P and Q, or (41)? 
(41) A didn't take B, A got B 
Recalling the interpretation given to not-P (38)-(40), we must 
say that (41) is to be interpreted as 
(42) not-Q and not-Rand Q 
(43) not-Q and Rand Q 
(44) Q and not-Rand Q 
Since, by juxtaposing two sentences, we have come up with two 
semantic renderings of them which are self-contradictory ((42) 
and (43)), we have accounted for the fact that we understand 
(41) as meaning (44) (simplified as (40)). 
But notice that all of this computing is necessary precisely 
because Bendix allows such expressions as_£ and R to be separate 
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semantic components in the first place. Bendix's theory thus 
asserts that the English sentence (37) could mean (45). 
(45) A caused himself to get B but he didn't get it 
Furthermore, the way in which these components are presented 
fails to show that this meaning is unacceptable. This is a serious 
weakness, it seems to me, and it points to a need within semantic 
theory of the notion of implication. Assertion P means R, but 
1! implies£• Exactly the relations that hold among these asser-
tions are covered by this statement. First of all, there is no 
occasion (since they are no longer separable components) for coming 
up with any expression which asserts 1! and denies£• The logical 
laws of implication correctly predict that although 'he took it' 
implies 'he got it' (modus ponens) and 'he didn't get it' implies 
'he didn't take it' (modus tollens), 'he didn't take it' fails to 
imply 'he didn't get it•. In this way we can account for the 
acceptability of (41) and the unacceptability of (39). It is true 
that in Bendix's final account of •take', he has only the causa-
tive component, but he gives no warning or explanation of this 
shift of analysis. The barest elaboration of a theory of implica-
tion, and the relationship such a theory might hold to the pheno-
menon of redundancy that Bendix does give some attention to, 
would have made it possible to improve the clarity of Bendix's 
presentation in invaluable ways. 
8. Criteriality. 
The concept of 'minimal definition' causes Bendix to leave 
out of his definition certain features of the meaning of an 
expression which are redundant within the system, and a tacit 
acknowledgement of the laws of implication had the effect of 
allowing him to leave out certain features of the meaning of an 
expression which are 'redundant' in a more formal sense--in that 
they are logically implied by the terms which have been included. 
The major purpose and effect of Bendix's semantic tests, however, 
is to distinguish between the criterial aspects of the meanings 
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of a word and what he unhappily calls its connotational meanings. 
A connotational meaning of an expression, on this usage, is some-
thing you expect to be true if the expression is true, but not 
necessarily so. Bendix illustrates the distinction in his treat-
ment of (expressions containing) the word 'lost'. Expression 
(46) 
(46) A loses Bat T 
means that A has B before time T and that A does not have B after 
T and that this change of state is unintentional. A connotation 
of (46) is that immediately after T, A does not know where Bis. 
Bendix has elaborated what he calls the 'but-test• for 
discovering connotational meanings. The test operates like this. 
Consider the two sentences (47) and (48). 
(47) 	 P but Q 
(48) P but not-Q 
The rule of thumb is that just in case one of these sentences 
sounds more natural than the other, then Q (if (48) is the more 
natural) or not-Q (if (47) is the more natural) is a connotation 
of P. In other words, if .S, is appropriately introduced by~ 
in a sentence, that must mean that Q is true in many cases where 
Pis true, but in this case not. Note that if .S were criterially 
associated with the meaning of g, then both sentences ought to 
sound equally strange, since one would be a tautology, the other 
a contradiction, and neither appropriately introduced by~-
The test can be illustrated as follows: 
(49) 	 He just lost his watch, but he knows where it is 
(50) 	 He just lost his watch, but he doesn't know 
where it is. 
Since (49) is all right but (50) isn't, 'not knowing where some-
thing is' is not a criterial attribute of 'having just lost it'. 
But now compare these two: 
(51) 	 He lost his watch at four o'clock, but just 
before that he had it. 
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(52) He lost his watch at four o'clock, but just 
before that he didn't have it. 
These are both bad, and so 'having a thing before T 1 is a 
(potential) criterial component of 'losing it at T1 • In this 
case, of course, the test itself does not decide which is 
criterial, the affirmation or the negation; other tests are 
required for that. 
Bendix's discussion of the 'but-test• tells us a great deal- about the semantics of the word~' but I am not convinced that 
the word can be put to effective use in tests for discovering 
other semantic facts. The test is not a positive test for 
criteriality, for when two sentences are equally odd, first there 
is no way of knowing which of the two second-olauses expresses 
the criterial attribute, and secondly there is no way of knowing 
if either of them does. Both of the following two sentences are 
odd; and presumably equally odd, but questions of criteriality 
are not relevant. The two clauses have no semantic connection 
whatever. 
(53) Mary is a mother, but I was born in Albania. 
(54) Mary is a mother, but I wasn't born in Albania. 
Furthermore, there are cases where there is a definite preference 
of one sentence over the other where in fact we would see 
criteriality in the meaning of the rejected second-clause. 
Consider the next two sentences: 
(55) Mary is a mother, but she has had some children. 
(56) Mary is a mother, but she hasn't had any 
children. 
We prefer (56) to (55), in spite of the fact that, generally 
speaking, to say of someone that she is a mother is to say that 
she has had at least one child; but the sentence is interpreted 
as informing us that there is some novel sense in which the speaker 
wishes us to understand the word 'mother'. Bendix is aware of 
these matters, and surveys quite generously the ways in which 
counter-examples to the 1 but-test' appear to show up; but my 
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point is that the kinds of judgments one must be able to make 
in order to interpret the results of the 'but-test' are in 
themselves sufficient to determine criteriality. If I know 
that in the one case (e.g., with lost) a usual sense of a word 
is intended, and in another case (e.g., with mother) some novel 
sense is being proposed, then I already know the very facts the 
'but-test' was devised to aid me in discovering. For all its 
genuine interest in demonstrating the meaning of the conjunction, 
this •test' is not at all what is needed for the distinction 
Bendix wishes to make operational. 
9. Presuppositions. 
I have suggested that Bendix's theory of semantics is in 
need of an explicit concept of implication, so that, in particular, 
the question of the number of semantic components can be resolved 
and certain logical relations between propositions asserted by 
sentences can be presented. Semantic theory should reveal, in 
other words, that if he took it, he got it. 
But there is another aspect of the meaning of an expression 
in addition to what it asserts and what it implies (and still 
quite apart from what it •connotes•), and that is what the expres-
sion presupposes. I suggested above that a noun phrase with a 
definite article generally presupposes the existence of the 
identified object. To see an instance of presupposition in one 
of Bendix's verbs, I would like to say that sentence (57) 
(57) A borrowed B from Cat T 
asserts (among other things) that A had B after T, but merely 
presupposes that Chad B before T. If A did not have B (in 
some sense), at least for a while, after T, sentence (57) would 
be simply inappropriate. 
To seek another example, the distinction I have in mind 
can be somewhat more richly illustrated in the following sentence: 
(58) 	 Bill doesn't even know that if he weren't in 
jail, he'd be assassinated within 24 hours. 
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The speaker of (58) assumes his audience to be surprised 
by what it is that Bill doesn't know (this is the effect of the 
~), the sentence presupposes that if he weren't in jail, 
Bill would be assassinated within 24 hours. (This is the effect 
of~.) It doesn't assert this, because the sentence is about 
Bill. The sentence further presupposes that Bill is now in 
jail. If Bill does not in fact know what the sentence says he 
does not know, the sentence is true; if he does know what the 
sentence denies he knows, the sentence is false. If any of 
the conditions presupposed by the sentence fails to hold, however, 
the sentence is merely not relevant. 
The distinction will come up again in the comments on the 
meanings of the specific English verbs that we must examine. In 
semantic analysis, we must be aware of what a sentence asserts, 
what it implies, what it presupposes, and we must be able to 
distinguish all these from what it merely connotes. 
10. Other 1 Tests 1 • 
. The 'semantic tests' which Bendix uses amount, as far as I 
can tel1 1 to little more than the practice of juxtaposing sen-
tences so that we will be reminded of the various uses of a word. 
The ways in which Bendix is willing to draw conclusions from his 
tests can be illustrated with, once again, the word give. The 
test demonstrates that certain putative properties of the verb 
are not in fact criterially associated with it. 
One might have begun by assuming that (59) 
(59) C gave B to A 
requires the understanding that A had Bin the first place, 
but (60) 
(60) John gave Bill a black eye 
shows that assumption to be false. One might have assumed that 
(59) implies that after C gave B to A, C no longer had B himself; 
but here sentence (61) 
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(61) John gave Bill the whooping cough 
shows that claim to be false too. If the two understandings 
suggested are valid in the case of a sentence like (62) 
(62) John gave Bill his car keys 
that is because of our knowledge of what kinds of things car 
keys are, and that, in particular, car keys can be possessed 
only by one person at a time. The 'transfer-of-possession' 
aspect of our understanding of (62), in other words, is not 
contributed by the word give itself. 
In this case, it might have been better to interpret give 
as a general causative verb that can be associated with various 
kinds of sentences whose main verb is have. The fact that John 
can give Bill the car keys, a black eye, and the whooping cough 
is then explained with reference to the knowledge that Bill can 
~ these things. In effect, this is precisely what Bendix 
is saying, but he presents this as a semantic fact, when it is 
really purely a syntactic one. The main problem--still a 
syntactic one--is to distinguish those uses of have which do 
and those which do not lend themselves to embedding in causa-
tive constructions with give. 
11. The Defini ti ons. 
HAVE. Bendix describes the word~ as having a general 
meaning and an inherent meaning, and both of these are related, 
in different ways, to expressions containing the verb be.-
In the inherent meaning of~, an expression of the kind 
(63) A has B 
can often be paraphrased as 
(64 ) C is AI s B 
where the genitive construction (and certain uses that are 
peculiar to it) is taken as basic. Formula (64) is exemplified 
by (65), which is taken to be the source of (66), a sentence 
exemplifying formula (63). 
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(65) C is John's son 
(66) John has a son 
However, there are many sentences of the type (63) where the 
'inherent' relation is understood, but which do not allow a 
paraphrase as (64). Bendix chooses to derive both (63) and 
(64) from more abstract sources, where the components are 
given as follows: 
(67) 'there is a relation between A and B' and 
'the relation is inherent' 
Here it is not clear to me whether (67) is the definition of 
(63)-(64), or whether (67) is in some sense the underlying 
structure of the other constructions. In either case, one 
cannot avoid the impression that in the case of the so-called 
inherent sense of l::.!.!!, one is not dealing with a verbal mean-
ing at all. The first set of examples that Bendix offers contains 
kinship terms like~' mother, uncle, certain other purely 
relational nouns such as friend, neighbor, and counterpart. 
It seems clear that in these cases it is nonsense to say that 
the verb~ asserts a relation between two nouns as in (68) 
(68) John has a friend 
or that~ has any such meaning at all in (69) 
(69) Bill is John's friend 
It seems rather to be the case that these nouns themselves 
express the relation. That is, a logical reformulation of~ 
(69) is (70) 
(70) Bill is-a-friend-to John 
where the relation between the two objects named~ and John 
happens to be expressed, not with a verb as is typically the 
case, but with a noun of a particular kind and requiring a 
particular grammatical construction. It happens to be among 
the syntactic facts of English that when both terms of the 
relation are identified (as in (69)), the genitive construction 
with~ is used; when only one term is expressed and the mere 
existence of the relation is asserted (with the second term 
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'left bank'), the construction with have is used (as in (68)). 
To speak of 'inherence' in the kind of verbal relation expressed 
by!:!.!! seems altogether to miss the point. 
Other uses of the so-called 'inherent'.!!!!.! can be accounted 
for on purely syntactic grounds as well. This is true of nouns 
expressing a part-whole relation (nouns like~' !,I!,~' .!:..22!) 
as well as nouns representing some property of an object used 
for naming some att.ribute of it (nouns like !2!:!!!,, condition, 
texture,~). In other words, (71) and (72) 
(71) the texture of this material is suitable 
(72) this material has a suitable texture 
are syntactically statable paraphrases, and any notion of 
'inherence' is to be associated with the meaning of the noun, not 
with the meaning of .h.2.!!• The function of~' in this case as 
in many others, seems to be related to the subjectivalization of 
a particular noun-phrase--in this case the 'possessor' noun. 7 
7For a further discussion of this matter, see the section 
entitled "The grammar of inalienable possession," in Fillmore 
(1968). 
Another function of .h!!!., seems to be to make into a predi-
cate (and thus to convert into a verbal expression) notions 
included only as nouns in their dictionary forms. In many cases 
synonymous expressions can be constructed using verbs, or 
adjectives with l!· Have courage is synonymous with be courageous, 
have a look is synonymous with~, while an expression like 
have the measles aeems to appear as a verb phrase only in thia 
way. 
It almost looks, in fact, as if both l!!.!! and~ are 
introduced exclusively by means of syntactic rules, and that to 
speak of either of these as capable of expressing meanings on 
their own is to be seriously confused about the general scope 
of semantic explanation. 
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Bendix's definition of the general meaning of 'have' is as 
follows: 
(73) 	 A has B --- Bis X A Y 
where: 	 (i) X = (a) with 
or (b) for 
or (c) to + Verb ~) 
or (d) Locative Preposition (+Z)-
(ii) Y may be null 
The rule is illustrated as follows: 
(74) 	 This list has the name you want--
The name you want is on this list. 
where: A= this list, B = the name you want, 
X = Locative 	Preposition= on, and Y is 
null 
Notice that this paraphrase schema is offered as an explanation 
of the •meaning' of A has B, not as a rule for converting 
sentences containing E.! into sentences containing~· Such 
a rule is admitted by Bendix to exist (and he states various 
aspects of it in an appendix on the topic transformation), but 
(73) is an expression of the general meaning of sentences with 
~, because the meaning of the~ sentences is less definite 
than any of the paraphrase sentences with be. He would say, 
take it, that a sentence like 
(75) This house has walls of the kind you like 
could be paraphrased as (76), (77), or (78) 
(76) 	 There are walls of the kind you like in the 
rooms of this house 
(77) 	 There are walls of the kind you like outside 
this house. 
(78) 	 There are walls of the kind you like around 
this house. 
and so on, and that the meaning of (75) is not ambiguous with 
respect to the various possible 'paraphrases', but it is simply 




Conditions on rule (73) specify the range of the paraphrase 
set, not a set of distinct paraphrases by which A has B 
sentence may be said to be ambiguous. 
Similarly, different understandings of a sentence like 
(79) I have the book you want 
are found in such differences in paraphrasability as seen in 
(80) The book you want is in my library 
and 
(81) The book you want is in my hand. 
Something is surely wrong here. We saw that for the 
inherent sense of have one does not need to speak of the 'meaning' 
of have at all but only of the meanings of the related nouns and 
the semantic effect of the syntactic relations which hold among 
them. For the general sense of~' however, it does not seem 
to be the case that the paraphrase set is in any sense conceptually 
prior to the uses of have; rather have is a verb which makes 
possible the topicalization of particular syntactically identified 
elements of sentences (in quite the way suggested by Bendix's 
topic transformation), and it also has an elliptical function. 
Moreover, there is an additional use of~, where it appears as 
a verb in its own right, and that is the use where it is more or 
less synonymous with possess. Notice, in this connection, how we 
generally understand a sentence like (82). 
(82) I judge my friends according to what they are, 
not what they have. 
Surely you would insist that I had misused my language if, on 
asserting (82), I then explained that what I meant was that the 
friends I value.!!.! rich and powerful, what they do not~ is 
honesty and wisdom. The ways in which (82) is understood 
straight on must be accounted for, it seems to me, by claiming 
that the linguistic form~ sometimes appears as a verb in 
its own right, and when it does it has a meaning semantically 
related to that of possess. 
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Having said this, it is now difficult to go on, because 
the words Bendix examines are words which require mention of 
~ in their definitions. We can at least note that the cases 
can be divided into two: those where the relationship is 
syntactic and relates to (partly) the same syntactic conditions 
as those which result in~' or those where the relationship 
is semantic and is intended with have in the possess sense. 
The verb give is of the former type, lend of the latter type. 
Let us now turn to some examples. 
FIND. Bendix defines (83) as (84), 
(83) A finds B 
(84) 'Ban-Rh a-D' and 'chance causes (Ban-Rh A)' 
by which symbolism he means that first there is some prior .h!!!-
relation between Band something else (what that something else 
is is irrelevant to the concept at hand, and so nothing more is 
said about D) and then, by chance, there comes about a have-
relation between Band A. I would suggest that the word~ 
is one which is not related to anything peculiar to .h!!! at all, 
and that the use of~ with an ordinary direct object is to 
be considered an extension of its use as an embedding-verb. 
Basically (85) is equivalent to (86), 
(85) A finds Sat T 
(86) A perceives Sat T 
where Sis a be sentence. Just in case the sentence is in a 
progressive form, transformations operate to give us such 
sentences as 
(87) John found his mother stealing chickens 
if Sis a predicate sentence of a particular kind, we get 
(88) John found his bride quite adept 
(89) they found him without any clothes on 
(90) they found him in the ditch 
I assume for the use of -find with just a direct object that 
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there is in the underlying sentence an indefinite locative 
phrase which can get deleted, so that a sentence like (91) is 
more or less semantically equivalent to (92). 
(91) John found his boots 
(92) John found his boots somewhere 
The fact that in some cases the associated S has modes of 
expression using 'have' appears to be a coincidence. We can 
say (93) as well as (94), or (95) as well as (96) 
(93) John found a solution to the problem 
(94) the problem has a solution 
(95) John found the umbrella behind the sofa 
(96) the sofa has an umbrella behind it 
but that is because some of the same sentences that can appear 
as complement to~ are sentences that permit topicalization. 
There seems very little gained in saying of John, the problem, 
and its solution in (93) that first there was a 'have' relation 
between the solution and the problem, later there came about 
(by chance) a have-relation between John and the solution; or 
in (95) that at first there was a ~-relation between the sofa 
and the umbrella (expressed in (96)) and later there came about 
a ~-relation between John and the umbrella; and most emphati-
cally, it seems inappropriate to say that in (91) there was 
first a ~-relation between somewhere and the boots, and then 
there came about a have-relation between John and those boots.-Statement of the semantic relations becomes so thoroughly formal, 
that we are forced to recognize the relations as being syntactic 
only. 
GET FOR. Bendix defines (97) as (98) 
(97) C gets AB 
(98) 'Ban-Rh a-D' and 1 C causes (Bis for A)• 
by which he means that there is some prior ~-relation between 
Band something else, and C causes B to be 'for' A. Notice that 
here, instead of questioning the relevance to this situation of 
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the primitive notion 'cause', Bendix chose to create a new 
underlying relation, expressed here a& 'Bis for A1 • He says 
of this relation (on p. 71) 
For seems to express some sort of purpose of futurity--
that 'A' will have 1 B1 • By using 1 B is for A', we 
thus account for the noncriterial rank of 'A has B', 
which is only a connotation here, in contrast to the 
case of C gives AB. 
What is important here, of course, is that C intended A to have 
B. I would therefore define (99) as (100). 
(99) C gets B for A at T 
(100) 	 C causes (C gets Bat T) and 
C intends (C gives B to A at some t after T) 
I.END and BORROW. Bendix defines (101) as (102), 
(101) 	 C lends AB 
(102) 	 1 B an-R C' and 'B not-is A's' andh 
'C causes ([Ban-Rh A] and [B not-changes to 
(Bis A1 s)J) 1 
by which he means that there is a prior have-relation between 
Band C, that B does not belong to A, that C causes there to be 
some 'have' relation between Band A, and that while B did not 
belong to A before this took place, it still doesn't belong to 
A after this takes place. 
It seems to me that ascribing the 'cause' to the lender with 
lend and to the borrower with borrow is not a criterial aspect 
of these words at all. What seems to be involved is an agreement 
on the part of borrower and lender. The difference between~ 
and borrow seems entirely to be a difference in the elements 
that can be omitted. Thus I would define (103) as (104), 
(103) 	 C lends B to A at T 
(104) 	 1 A gets Bat T', and 1 A is obliged (A gives B 
to Cat some time later than T)• 
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In fact, then, I would define (105) in exactly the same way. 
(105) A borrows B from Cat T. 
TAKE FROM. Bendix defines (106) as (107), 
(106) 	 A takes B from C 
(107) 'Ban-Rh C1 and 1 A causes (Ban-~ A) 1 
by which he means that there is a prior have-relation between 
Band C and A does something which brings about a have-relation 
between Band A. I would define (108) as (109). 
(108) 	 A takes B from C at T 
(109) 	 A causes (A gets B at T) 
Presupposition: C had B before T 
would say that the latter is presupposed, merely, and that it 
is not part of the information that one would directly communicate 
to someone by means of this sentence, because the presupposition 
is unaffected by sentence negation. That is, sentence (110) 
presupposes, just as much as does (111) that the children first 
had some candy. 
(110) 	 I didn't take any candy from the children 
(111) I took some candy from the children 
The having of candy on the part of the children is a condition 
which must be present in order for it to be relevant to say 
whether I did or did not take the candy away from them. If 
this were an aspect of the asserted meaning of (108), it would 
be denied under negation. 
12. Summary. 
My review of Bendix's monograph has been long, and it has 
been largely negative. It has been long because Bendix's 
discussion deals relevantly and appealingly with extremely 
crucial issues in semantic theory, and I could not resist going 
over them myself. If it has been negative it is because Bendix's 
proposals are specific enough to be wrong and insightful enough 
to be interestingly wrong. 
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I have criticized his definitions in his own terms, though 
I tend to feel that in the end semantic descriptions of lexical 
items will be based on rather different principles than those 
Bendix has assumed. In particular I believe that a theory about 
the presuppositional level of linguistic communication is a 
prerequisite to any full-blown theory of semantic structure, and 
I am convinced that we need a semantic theoy that is much more 
clearly related to syntactic facts than Bendix has suggested. If 
I had reasonably sound and coherent views on the nature of this 
improved lexical and semantic theory, my review would be longer 
still. There are many excellent scattered essays in the ling-
uistic and philosophical literature on the semantic structure of 
individual words, 8 but I am convinced that for the range of 
8For samples of the best of this work in the linguistic 
literature, see the recent work of Jeffreys. Gruber, especially 
Gruber (1967). 
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